Text: William Henry Gravely, Jr., “Chapter 04,” The Early Political and Literary Career of Thomas Dunn English Story, dissertation, 1953 (This material is protected by copyright)

[page 165:]

The sudden shift in the scene of English's political activities from Philadelphia to New York was due to developments growing out of President Tyler's decision to remain, at least temporarily, in the Presidential race for 1844. Tyler made this decision after the Senate had rejected the treaty with Texas which, after a long period of negotiation, he had submitted for the consideration of that body on April 22, 1844. If the Senate had approved this treaty, the annexation of Texas would have been assured, and Tyler could have withdrawn from the contest without any fear that his withdrawal would affect the cause of annexation adversely. But the Senate refused to approve the treaty, and consequently John Tyler elected to keep the issue of annexation alive by becoming its champion in the approaching campaign. A brief review of the President's previous activities in behalf of annexation, together with a consideration of the circumstances that led to the formation of his own personal party and his acceptance of the nomination tendered by it, will throw light upon the precise nature of English's mission in New York.

As Justin H. Smith pertinently observes in his able study, The Annexation of Texas, “John Tyler had the rare misfortune of descending into history cursed by one political [page 166:] party yet without the benediction of the other.”(1) Consequently, it was inevitable, no matter what measures the “President without a party” advocated, that his enemies on all sides would impugn his motives. The more prejudiced of the Whigs, of course, blaming him for all their wrecked hopes, could, or would, see little good in any political end that he sought to achieve. On the other hand, many influential Democrats, either because they resented his having left the party of his allegiance to ally himself with the Whigs or because they feared that his espousal of popular Democratic measures would win for him acclaim at the expense of the current leaders of the party, were inclined to minimize the importance of his influence and to ascribe motives such as “vanity” or “self-interest” to his political efforts.

Thus it was that Tyler's enemies, as soon as it became apparent that he intended to press vigorously for the annexation of Texas, began to belittle his intentions. Besides being only too willing to impute to him unworthy or at least selfish motives, they were doubtless actuated also by a desire to keep a dangerous question like that of annexation from becoming the leading issue in the approaching national election. “Personal ambition” and “a purpose to dissolve the Union” were two of the more unexalted motives ascribed to Tyler for negotiating the [page 167:] treaty of annexation which he submitted to the Senate on April 22, 1844.(2) Henry Clay described the negotiations as “infamous” and their purpose as “sinister,”(3) even though he himself had tried to secure Texas from Mexico at a time when Spain still looked upon Mexico as a part of her legitimate empire.(4)

Unfortunately, largely because of the uncompromising attitudes of the abolitionists in the North and of the nullificationists in the South, the question of annexation did precipitate something of a sectional struggle between the slaveholding and the non-slave-holding States.(5) Yet even though Tyler, in submitting the treaty to the Senate, did allude to the “protection and security” that its acceptance would give to the Southern States “as well against all domestic as foreign efforts to disturb them,”(6) the tenor of the entire paper essentially supports his own claim elsewhere that he saw in the measure to annex Texas only “the country, and the whole country — not this or that section, this or that local interest — but the WHOLE — the good, the strength, the happiness, the glory of [page 168:] the whole country.”(7)

But Tyler's enemies were unwilling to acknowledge that he had the interests of the whole country at heart. John Quincy Adams saw in the agitation for annexation “the immediate crisis of a great struggle between slavery and freedom throughout the world,” and although acknowledging the political boldness and adroitness with which Tyler had outmaneuvered Van Buren and Clay, he felt that Tyler's motives in pressing annexation were selfish and that he was willing to gamble with a sectional issue as a “last card for a popular whirlwind to carry him through.”(8) Thomas H. Benton maintained that the injection of the issue into the campaign of 1844 could be traced directly to political intrigue behind which John C. Calhoun was the moving spirit.(9) Benton professedly saw the hand of Calhoun in a letter written by Thomas Walker Gilmer and published in a Baltimore newspaper during the winter of 1842-43. The letter had urged that Texas be annexed at once as a necessary measure to restrain Great Britain from carrying out ominous designs against her. In the words of Benton, Gilmer's letter charged that these designs “aimed at a political and military domination on [page 169:] our southwestern border, with a view to abolition and hostile movements against us.”(10) Benton contended that there were no grounds for suspecting Great Britain of any such sinister designs.

The comments of Adams and Benton, however, evince strong personal bias. The evidence indicates not only that Tyler became interested in the question of annexation long before the alleged machinations of Calhoun occurred, but also that he early conceived of it in terms of the national interest. At the very beginning of his Administration, according to the testimony of Henry A. Wise, Tyler agreed with his advisers that Texas should be annexed at the earliest opportunity.(11) More important than any statement of Tyler's friends, however, is the evidence contained in his letter to Webster, written as far back as October 11, 1841. After emphasizing to his Secretary of State the importance of their looking “to the whole country and to the whole people,” Tyler continued:

It is true that Tyler did not continue to urge annexation during the first two years of his Administration. Not only did the President and his Secretary of State have conflicting opinions in regard to this question, but the current political situation precluded any possibility that the Senate would approve a treaty negotiated with such an end in view.(13) Consequently, Tyler had no recourse but to disregard his personal inclinations and twice to refuse proffers of annexation at a time when Sam Houston an advocate of annexation, was President of Texas.(14)

Soon, however, a more auspicious moment did arrive. Webster resigned from the Cabinet on May 8, 1843, and no longer was the President under the handicap of having a Secretary of State who was opposed to annexation. In July, 1843, Abel P. Upshur, a warm annexationist, was given the post, Hugh S. Legaré having served for approximately a month as Secretary of State, ad interim.(15) Houston, rebuffed in his efforts to further the cause of annexation, had succeeded in playing upon the fears of the United States by orienting the policies of the Texan government in the direction of Great Britain.(16) Fearing that unless quick action were taken to prevent Texas from [page 171:] falling under the domination of Great Britain the cause of annexation might be irretrievably lost, Tyler authorized his new Secretary of State to proceed with the preliminary steps leading toward annexation.(17) Finally, on October 16, 1843, Upshur offered to negotiate with the Texan minister, Van Zandt, “whenever he should be prepared with proper powers to meet him.”(18) By this time, however, the political situation in Texas had undergone a change, and it was not until April 12, 1844, after months of diplomatic effort — a period during which Upshur lost his life and Calhoun became Secretary of State — that a treaty was finally negotiated.(19) On April 22, 1844, it was submitted to the Senate, which proceeded to reject it by a large majority.

A few days after the rejection of the treaty, letters of Van Buren and Clay opposing immediate annexation were published on the same date in two different Washington newspapers, the Globe and the National Intelligencer respectively.(20) Thereupon, Tyler, who by this time had [page 172:] given up all hope of being the next Democratic nominee but who had also gained somewhat in popular favor by his efforts in behalf of annexation, decided to allow his friends to hold a special Democratic convention for the purpose of nominating him for the Presidency. Tyler's friends arranged to convene on May 27, 1844, in Baltimore, the regular Democrats having already chosen to hold their convention on the same date and in the same city. In his letter of May 30th accepting the nomination tendered him by the special convention, Tyler said:

If, as John Tyler, Jr., maintained,(22) his father had no hopes of being elected when he allowed his friends to nominate him for the Presidency, and he followed this course solely to force the regular Democratic convention [page 173:] to reject Van Buren, an anti-annexationist, why, it may be argued, did he not immediately abandon the contest and throw his support to Polk as soon as the Democrats declared for annexation? The answer seems to be, in part, that Tyler felt a keen sense of loyalty to his political friends and was unwilling to abandon the contest until they were accepted by the regular Democrats as loyal members of the party. These men, like John Tyler himself, had incurred the displeasure of both major parties, and until some provision should be made for their future political security, Tyler was determined not to desert them. A still more compelling reason for the stand he took was his knowledge that unless the Democrats made this overture of friendship, the full and concerted strength which was behind his own candidacy could not be employed in such a way as to produce the most telling effect.(23)

John Tyler's explanation of the formation of his own separate party is most interesting. It will be recalled [page 174:] that fairly early in his Administration it became evident that neither of the two major political parties was willing to follow his leadership. True, when his vetoes of the Bank bills in 1841 separated him completely from the Whigs, many Democrats sang his praises. But after the Democratic victories in the autumn of 1842, which Tyler regarded as a popular endorsement of his policies, the controlling element of the party soon let it be known that the President was still a renegade in the eyes of the leaders. Both Whig and Democratic newspapers savagely attacked him. Consequently, as Tyler wrote to his brother-in-law, Alexander Gardiner, on July 11, 1846, “it was esteemd [sic] every way proper to organize a separate party ostensibly in reference to the Presidency in my own person, but in truth for the sole purpose of controlling events by throwing in the weight of that organization for the public good.”(24) It was for this reason, according to Tyler, as well as “to preserve such organization until the proper time should arrive for striking a decisive blow” that he allowed his friends to nominate him.(25) What Tyler meant by “the proper time” for taking decisive action is clear from the following explanation to Gardiner:

In other words, even after the weight of his third party organization had been thrown in “for the public good” and the defeat of Van Buren had thereby been accomplished, Tyler was politician enough to know that the time was not yet ripe for the disbanding of his organization. He realized, of course, that this organized strength would disintegrate as soon as he withdrew from the contest. He knew also that all party organizations — his own not excepted — were composed largely of practical, hard-boiled politicians, whose sense of loyalty was more likely to spring from a common hope of bettering themselves materially than from any unusually high devotion to principle. A great many of these practical politicians were undoubtedly more concerned about retaining their offices than they were about annexing Texas. Tyler realized, aside from his commendable feeling of loyalty toward these men, that if their full strength were to be delivered to Polk, the pro-Texas candidate, then he himself would have to remain in the contest until his followers could make the best bargain possible with the Democratic leaders. Otherwise, Henry Clay might receive enough support from the President's disgruntled followers [page 176:] to enable him to win the election and thereby do irreparable damage to the cause of annexation.

The threat to Polk and the cause of annexation, unless the Democratic Party could manage to fall heir to President Tyler's potential strength, was no small one. Democratic leaders tried to minimize this threat, but there was evidence of panic in their ranks not long after the President's supporters began to organize for the battle. Robert J. Walker, Democratic Senator from Mississippi, received alarming news of organized support for Tyler in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York.(27) In Philadelphia two separate meetings of President Tyler's friends on July 4, 1844,(28) indicated that there was cause for alarm. In view of his son's influence over the Irish Repealers, John Tyler was doubtless correct in maintaining two years later that if his friends in Philadelphia had refused to support Polk, the latter would have lost the election. “Upon the receipt of my letter of withdrawal in Philadelphia,” said Tyler in a letter to his brother-in-law, “the Chinese Musaeum was crowded by 6000 of my friends who went over to Mr. Polk in a body and thereby securd [sic] him the vote of that great State — I say nothing of the elections elsewhere — nor is it necessary — The loss of Pennsylvania would have lost him the [page 177:] election.”(29)

But Pennsylvania was not the only State in which the friends of President Tyler probably held the balance of power.(30) All signs pointed to an exceedingly close race between Polk and Clay in New York. The politicians behind the candidacy of President Tyler, sensing that they had an unusually good opportunity to exert a potent influence on the political situation there, lost no time in marshaling their forces in order to increase their bargaining power with the regular Democratic organization throughout the State. The city of New York, especially, was the scene of much maneuvering for position. There, the numerous professional politicians who held office under President Tyler were determined that the patronage of the Administration should be used to force the leaders of Tammany Hall into a conciliatory frame of mind toward the President and toward themselves. It was in the interest of this group of politicians that Administration leaders close to the President decided to offer the editorship of the New York Aurora to Thomas Dunn English. Hence, the Philadelphia Pennsylvanian of July 15, 1844, carried [page 178:] the following notice:

In his political novel, 1844; or. The Power of the “S. F.”, English has left a revealing account of the political situation in New York as it had developed up to the middle of July, 1844, and also of the circumstances that led to his being sent to the city to edit the Aurora.(32) According to English, the chances of a Democratic victory in the State of New York were greatly endangered by two developments. First, many of Van Buren's friends, resenting his failure to receive the Democratic nomination, resorted to secret action to defeat Polk; and secondly, President Tyler's continued presence in the field of candidates prevented the Democratic Party from falling heir to the patronage of the existing Administration. Of these two dangers English regarded the latter as the more imminent. Because of the influence wielded by the Administration, either directly through its power of appointment or indirectly through the influence of its appointees in the custom houses, post offices, and the like, the Democratic leaders feared that unless President Tyler could be persuaded or compelled to withdraw from the contest, his friends might be able to force more than [page 179:] twelve thousand votes against Polk in the State of New York and thereby bring about the defeat of the Democratic nominee both in the State and in the nation. Commenting further upon the existing conditions, English wrote:

Of course, a victory for Clay over Polk could scarcely in any way benefit President Tyler's friends, nor did many of them desire such an outcome. As practical, bargaining politicians, however, they clearly saw that the threat of a triumph by Clay could be used to achieve their common end, which was that the regular Democratic leaders should welcome them as equals into the party fold. Unless they could achieve this end, many of them were doubtless prepared to pull down the temple in ruins over themselves and the Democratic leaders alike. They desired, of course, a happier solution, but, as the following account by English indicates, it was difficult to effect: [page 180:]

That two men so close to President Tyler as his son and his brother-in-law selected English as the man to undertake a mission of this sort indicates unquestionably [page 181:] that the young Philadelphian had the full confidence of the Administration. The two men who made the choice were Robert Tyler, with whom English had already formed a close political association, and Alexander Gardiner, who had recently become the brother-in-law of John Tyler when Gardiner's sister, Julia, became the President's wife on June 26, 1844. When English moved to New York, Alexander Gardiner was already keeping the President in close touch with political conditions throughout the State, and he seems to have been the one adviser on whom the President especially relied to inform him whether the professional politicians and officeholders in the State were conducting their affairs creditably.(35)

Apparently neither President Tyler nor Alexander Gardiner was altogether satisfied that the office-holding clique in New York City, if left too much to its own devices, would play the game of politics in a manner that would enable the President to withdraw from the contest with credit to himself and to his Administration. It is significant that shortly before English went to New York City to take charge of the Aurora Tyler appointed Cornelius Van Ness, a former governor of Vermont, as Collector of Customs in the same city.(36) Van Ness, although a friend [page 182:] of Tyler, was never, as he later confided to Polk, “what was properly termed a Tyler man.”(37) Not only was he completely out of sympathy with the movement that led to the organization of the President's separate party and to his nomination by a separate convention, but he never attended meetings organized by Tyler's friends. “At the time of my appointment,” he confided also to Polk, “there were a number of Mr. Tyler's pretended friends who were determined upon a third party organization, and the greatest efforts were made to press me into the measure, with the influence of the Custom House under my charge. I knew the secret object was to aid the election of Mr. Clay, and I was determined to defeat their schemes.”(38) Furthermore, according to Van Ness, Tyler approved of his appointee's course and retained confidence in him. Evidently, although the President was willing, because of a feeling of loyalty toward his political supporters, to accede to their wishes so long as their actions resulted in no real injury to the cause of Polk and annexation, he was determined not to countenance any selfish scheme on the part of certain of these same supporters that would work out to the advantage of Clay.

A letter dated July 14, 1844, from Alexander Gardiner to his sister — then the President's wife — reveals that [page 183:] Gardiner had misgivings similar to those of the President, about some of the office-holding friends of the Administration in New York, as well as a similar feeling of confidence in Van Ness. Gardiner evidently had a rather poor opinion of Col. Graham, Redwood Fisher, and certain other politicians of the group that had recently taken the New York Aurora into its own hands. Apparently, too, he had previously expressed his misgivings to the President's wife, as the following extract from the letter would seem to imply:

Thus, the difficulty of English's political mission in New York City becomes apparent. Trusted by the Administration, like Van Ness, he was yet under the handicap of editing a newspaper which had been taken over by a group of men whose political respectability was questionable and in whom the Administration had only a limited amount of confidence. As editor, he was free to threaten [page 184:] the Democratic leaders with defeat in order to help President Tyler's friends obtain as satisfactory a union as possible with the regular Democrats. At the same time, as his selection by Robert Tyler and Alexander Gardiner would most certainly indicate, he was counted upon to take no editorial stand that would embarrass the President himself or weaken his position when the opportune moment for his withdrawal arrived.

English's editorial task was all the more difficult because of the nearly unanimous opposition of the New York press.(40) Nonetheless, it must have been an interesting experience for a controversially inclined young editor like English to be continually taking issue with the political views of numerous other editors, many of whom, such as Horace Greeley of the Tribune and James Gordon Bennett of the Herald were far abler journalists than he.(41) Since there is no extant file of the Aurora during [page 185:] the period that English served as editor, one must lean heavily on the scattered editorial comments of antagonistic and consequently more or less biased journalists in order to supplement the meagre information that can be found elsewhere concerning the Aurora during the last half-year of its existence.

Less than a week after he began editing the Aurora. English was already applying editorial pressure of the [page 186:] threatening sort against the Democratic leaders. Before he took charge of the paper the editorial policy had been one of persuasion. As early as June 8, 1844, the Clay Tribune had commented on a letter appearing the day before in the Aurora, in which the writer spoke glowingly of the Democratic principles of President Tyler's friends and asserted that these friends could be counted upon not to follow any course of action that would help Clay provided they were “met in a proper spirit of conciliation and compromise by the friends of Mr. Polk.”(42) The writer praised President Tyler as one who, although shamefully mistreated, would sacrifice his own ambition rather than pursue a course that would bring about the election of Clay. President Tyler and his friends, said the writer, would do all they could, “consistent with his honor as a man and his character as a statesman, to avert such an appalling disaster.”(43) The writer of the letter then went on to say that the friends of Polk had proposed that their candidate and Tyler run in every State on a joint ticket with a single set of electors, the electoral vote in each State going to the candidate receiving the largest vote. Greeley saw in this proposition a scheme “to hoodwink John Tyler to the last moment, and turn in his little capital to the aid of the Polk and Texas ticket.”(44) Two weeks later, the [page 187:] Clay Tribune quoted the Aurora as saying that arrangements for an alliance between the friends of Polk and Tyler were “progressing to a rapid conclusion.”(45)

The change in editorial policy that followed the installation of English as editor of the Aurora is clearly discernible in a comment by the New York Evening Post for the Country, which reproduced from the Tyler organ portions of an editorial by English:

Thus, within a period of only a few weeks, we have amusing evidence of the opposite effects that the shifting tactics of the Tyler forces were producing in the minds of newspaper editors of contrary political views. We observe Greeley, a Whig, interpreting the earlier tactics of the Tyler men to mean that Tyler's strength would be thrown to Polk, and the editor of the Evening Post, a Democrat, interpreting the later tactics to indicate that this same strength would be thrown to Clay. The tendency of both Greeley and the editor of the Post to discount the operations of Tyler's followers while still speculating as to what these operations meant would seem to indicate that both editors were considerably more disturbed about the uncertainty of Tyler's plans, as well as about the eventual disposition of his strength if he should withdraw from the contest, than they were willing to admit.

But in spite of their assuming a more independent and aggressive attitude toward the regular Democrats, the politicians in control of President Tyler's separate organization were, of course, only too willing to listen to a satisfactory proposal of union. This fact is clearly demonstrated in a letter from English to Emanuel Fisher, editor of the Cleveland Republican, written shortly after English has assumed editorial control over the Aurora.(47) The [page 189:] editor of the Republican had apparently sought information concerning the future course of President Tyler's friends in order that he might thereby determine the policy of his own paper. English's reply, which follows, was written in strictest confidence — a confidence which seems to have been flagrantly violated:

The mass meeting referred to by English in this letter was held according to schedule at the Apollo Saloon on the evening of July 23, 1844, and was well attended. Its object was to ratify the nomination recently accorded the President by his special convention in Baltimore. The New York Herald devoted more than two complete columns to a vivid description of the meeting, which was tense and extremely tempestuous near the beginning.(49) The confusion was due partly to the discordant elements present and partly to the manner in which the meeting was organized. The regular organization of President Tyler's friends had called the meeting and had published the official summons in the Aurora of July 23rd.(50) Naturally, these stalwarts of the Administration were present in force. Also attending the meeting, however, were a large number of the Young Democrats, under the leadership of the famous Mike Walsh. Walsh was an extremely popular and independent radical who was greatly feared by the leaders of Tammany Hall because of his ability to sway the masses with [page 192:] his highly emotional and flowery oratory. In spite of his garishness and vulgarity, Mike Walsh was a fearless leader, idolized by his devoted followers. During the first two years of John Tyler's Administration Walsh had been one of the President's most ardent supporters and had served for a while as Washington correspondent for the Aurora. But Walsh's early enthusiasm for the Administration had waned because of his opposition to the regular Tyler organization in New York City. Although still professing admiration for John Tyler as a man, he had come to the ratification meeting in no friendly frame of mind toward the leaders of the organization, who, he felt, had fallen under the domination of a selfish office-holding clique.(51)

Of course, the regular organization, with which Alexander Gardiner and Thomas Dunn English were associated, was determined to retain control of the meeting which it had called. Accordingly, somewhat before the meeting was scheduled to open at 8 o’clock, members of the organization took matters into their own hands and nominated Mr. Shaler, an alderman, as chairman. This action immediately [page 193:] aroused the ire of Mike Walsh's followers, who forthwith nominated their hero. Then followed a chaotic scene which threatened to break up the gathering before harmony could be restored. It was vividly described in the Herald as follows, probably by Bennett himself:

After Mike Walsh's conciliatory remarks, the meeting progressed smoothly enough. The organization speakers eulogized John Tyler and directed all of their oratorical fire against Clay. Although not once alluding to the [page 194:] possibility of a union of the Polk and Tyler forces, they made no derogatory remarks about the Democratic nominee. By merely ignoring the possibility of a union with Polk and stressing John Tyler's claims to Democratic support, they hoped to frighten the Democratic leaders into agreeing to acceptable terms. Those speaking for the regular organization were Delazon Smith, Thomas Dunn English, and a Mr. Ellis, of Missouri, known as “Judge” Ellis.

In the longest speech of the evening, Delazon Smith went into great detail to show how the careers of Thomas Jefferson and John Tyler ran parallel to each other. Mike Walsh, although expressing admiration for Tyler, devoted a considerable portion of his speech to an attack upon the office-holding clique which he contended had deceived the President. A number of humorous sallies doubtless relieved the tension that his speech would otherwise have caused. English, who only a few days before had become editor of the Aurora, spoke as soon as Mike Walsh had finished. According to the Herald, he “was most loudly called for amid cries of ‘stranger.’ ” After making a few preliminary remarks concerning the Democratic principles of justice and political equality, English continued:

After English had left the platform, a Mr. Kelly briefly introduced Judge Ellis, who delivered the final speech of the evening.

From the point of view of Tyler's followers the ratification meeting was unquestionably a success. Alexander Gardiner, who had attended the gathering without taking an active part in the proceedings, lost no time in writing a letter to his sister in Washington so that she might convey to the President an accurate account of what had occurred. The letter, dated Tuesday night, July 23, was written just after Gardiner had come home from the meeting. Aside from a postscript which has no bearing on the matter under discussion, the letter follows in its entirety: [page 196:]

The “firm stand” which Gardiner hoped might “bring the friends of Polk to favorable terms” and which English, as an instrument of the regular Tyler organization, was now advocating, both in his speeches and in his editorials, had already begun to produce favorable results even before the ratification meeting in New York City took place. For two weeks or more a powerful leader of the Democratic Party — Robert J. Walker of Mississippi — had been receiving disturbing reports of the progress already made by President Tyler's organizations in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. Alarmed at what he had heard, Walker reluctantly decided that it was his duty to pay a personal visit to the White House in order to ascertain at first hand precisely what were the President's intentions. Acting on this decision, Walker visited the President on July 9, 1844, and after a long interview came away with information that was vitally important to those who were striving for a Democratic victory in November. The next day, he wrote to Polk, giving him the substance of the information disclosed by the President and expressing his own opinion as to the course which the Democratic nominee ought to pursue in regard to it.(55) [page 198:]

According to Walker's letter to Polk, Tyler unequivocally stated that he entertained no hopes of being the next President; that he earnestly desired the election of Polk and Dallas; and that he would immediately withdraw from the field were he not of the opinion that such a withdrawal would in no way increase the likelihood of Democratic success. The President made it clear that his friends were dissatisfied with the treatment accorded them by the Democrats and that they “were so exasperated by the assaults of the Globe & other presses, that if he withdrew, they would either remain neutral, or many of them join Mr Clay.” Tyler also disclosed — so Walker told Polk — ”that his friends numbered about 150,000, that they were chiefly republicans who voted for the whigs in 1840, & that if a different course were pursued towards them, that if they could be assured on reliable authority that they would be received with pleasure & confidence by you & your friends generally into the ranks of the democratic party, & treated as Brethren & equals, that he would at once withdraw, & that his friends with all their influence & pressure would then he had no doubt come in, & uniting every where [sic] zealously & efficiently with us, render our victory certain.”

Walker felt that Polk should lose no time in adopting the friendly measures proposed by Tyler, and so expressed himself. “Now I think,” he wrote, “that the importance of this union & cooperation cannot be overated [sic]. In my [page 199:] judgment it would be decisive in our favour, & is right in itself.”(56) He urged that Polk write to some friend a conciliatory letter approving the union suggested by Tyler and that this letter be shown to the President. He urged, too, that Polk have Andrew Jackson write a similar letter for publication in which the old General would commend the President and express the opinion that if Tyler should withdraw from the race the Democratic Party would then joyfully receive the latter's friends into the fold and not discriminate against them in the future because of their previous political alignments. Finally, realizing that Francis P. Blair was doing much to alienate Tyler and his friends by ceaselessly abusing them in the Globe, Walker suggested that Polk ask Jackson to write Blair a letter urging him to discontinue his editorial attacks upon Tyler and Tyler's supporters.

On July 23rd Polk wrote to Jackson and at the same time sent him the letter from Walker.(57) Polk said that he was opposed to Walker's suggestion that he himself should write to Tyler. Moreover, he was also opposed to making commitments to anyone prior to the election. Polk did suggest, however, that Jackson write a conciliatory letter to Tyler and went so far as to add confidentially that if he should win the election he would have “no [page 200:] prejudices or unkind feelings towards any portion of the party.” Because he earnestly desired the triumph of Democratic principles, he was most anxious “to witness a harmonious reunion of all the old Jacksonian Democrats of ‘28 & ‘32.” Polk also indicated his disapproval of the attacks of the Globe upon Tyler and expressed the fear that these attacks might persuade Tyler to run independently. “A seperate [sic] Tyler ticket,” he wrote, “might put in jeopardy the vote of several closely contested States, — and perhaps affect the final result.”

In replying to Polk's letter, Jackson emphatically expressed his opposition to the proposal that either he or Polk should write the kind of letter requested of them.(58) Jackson said that any published letter from himself or any other friend of Polk expressing the opinion that if Tyler withdrew from the canvass his followers “should be received & be upon the same level with all other Democrats in the selection for office” would be regarded as evidence of “a bargain & intrigue for the presidency” and would result in Polk's defeat. The friends of Tyler, in Jackson's opinion, were “a mere drop in the buckett [sic]” and were powerless to prevent the election of Polk provided no damning letter were written.

In spite of Jackson's confidence in a Democratic victory, and his objection to writing for publication the sort [page 201:] of letter urged by Walker, he had actually written — on the same day that he replied to Polk — a letter to Major William B. Lewis which was destined to achieve essentially the same results as those anticipated from the proposed letter which he had refused to write.(59) In his letter to Lewis, Jackson expressed himself as having “a great desire that Mr. Tyler should close his term with credit to himself.” Tyler could accomplish this end, so Jackson felt, if he were to withdraw magnanimously and thereby not only “add great and lasting popularity to himself” but also refute the baseless charges that selfish motives were behind his ardent advocacy of the annexation of Texas. Furthermore, using guarded as well as apparently somewhat evasive language, Jackson wrote:

Later, in the same letter, Jackson expressed himself as being unwilling to write to, Tyler upon the subject of the latter's withdrawal. But, as Lyon G. Tyler points out, the promises held out to the President's followers in this letter, although not actually made by Jackson, [page 202:] were published as having come from him and were not retracted by him.(60) Thus they had the same effect upon Tyler's followers as if Jackson had written precisely the sort of letter which Robert J. Walker had originally desired and to which Jackson had expressed unalterable opposition.

Of course, it may be argued that Jackson was not responsible for the misleading extract from his letter to Lewis which political leaders saw fit to publish in order to effect a reconciliation between Tyler's supporters and the regular Democrats. Obviously, Jackson could not have renounced the published extract without perhaps causing irreparable injury to the cause of Polk. For the original letter had already been shown to Tyler, who, only two days before the publication of the distorted portion of it, wrote to Jackson announcing his intention to withdraw from the race and referring to the views expressed by Jackson in the original letter as having determined his decision.(61)

But, although the published extract from Jackson's letter to Lewis unquestionably represented Jackson as having made promises which he had warily avoided making, [page 203:] the resulting misrepresentation of his sentiments was more apparent than real. Less than a week after he wrote to Lewis and more than two weeks before the distorted extract was published, Jackson wrote a letter to John Y. Mason, then Secretary of the Navy, in which he held out to Tyler and his followers the same hopes of complete reconciliation that the published portion of the letter to Lewis had erroneously held out to them.(62) Advising Mason as to the proper course for Tyler to pursue, Jackson said: “Should he soon come out with an address to the democracy, and withdraw from the canvass, he will retire the 4th of March next with a greater popularity than he ever possessed, and the democracy supporting him for the presidency of course fall [sic] into the ranks of the whole democracy without any distinction whatever.”(63)

At any rate, Tyler had been satisfied with the tone of Jackson's letter to Lewis, and on August 20, 1844, the President's letter of withdrawal appeared in the [page 204:] Madisonian.(64) Although the letter to Lewis was admittedly the decisive factor which finally caused Tyler to announce his withdrawal, there were other determining factors also. Among these was the conciliatory tone of the Democratic press generally, which was eager for reunion and harmony.(65) Another determining factor was a set of resolutions passed by a group of Democrats in New York City on August 6th and transmitted to the President by a committee of eight, which included his own appointee to the Collectorship of the Port of New York, Cornelius P. Van Ness.(66) These resolutions praised the President's conduct of affairs, but urged a union of all men of Democratic sympathies as the sure means of accomplishing the defeat of Henry Clay.

The tone of the Washington Globe, under Blair's editorship, continued to run counter to that of the generally conciliatory Democratic press. In the same letter in which he had informed Jackson of his decision to withdraw from the canvass, Tyler had expressed his unqualified disapprobation of the Globe's abusive course. Furthermore, he had warned Jackson that unless this course were rectified, the consequences might prove fatal to hopes of a Democratic victory in the approaching election.(67) Jackson, who had earlier been disposed to minimize Tyler's strength, [page 205:] was genuinely disturbed by Blair's attitude. Consequently, he lost little time dispatching a letter to the editor of the Globe, urging him to adopt a friendly and conciliatory policy toward Tyler and the latter's friends on the ground that if the Democratic newspapers followed such a course, then the withdrawal of Tyler would “ensure the triumphant election of Polk & Dallas, & the reannexation of Texas.”(68) Jackson urged Blair to commend Tyler for his patriotism in withdrawing from the canvass and to “hail welcome to the democratic ranks, as brothers, all his adherents who unites [sic] with us in putting down that unprincipled man Clay.”

At any rate, the conciliatory attitude of Jackson and other prominent Democrats, as well as the widespread friendliness of the Democratic press, was productive of good results, and when the November election took place most of Tyler's followers voted for Polk.(69) In States where the contest promised to be close, this additional strength was extremely important to Polk and may in more than one instance have been decisive. Since New York was one of the doubtful States, Thomas Dunn English's political mission there was far from finished when President Tyler's letter of withdrawal appeared in the Madisonian. The [page 206:] young editor of the Aurora and champion of John Tyler and his policies now plunged wholeheartedly into the battle to elect the regular Democratic nominees. The annexation of Texas was the great issue, and English was one of its most eager advocates.

But it was not only as an editor that English exerted his influence in the campaign of 1844. He was the leading figure in a political organization known as the White Eagle Club and made frequent stump speeches in support of the Democratic ticket. On the evening of September 16th, both English and Robert Tyler were among those addressing a huge meeting in Tammany Hall, “in all our observation of great political assemblages in this city,” commented the New York Morning News on the day after the meeting, “we have never witnessed any which equalled the Democratic Gathering of last evening.”(70) English, in the words of the News, “took up the subject of annexation and discussed it with much ability.” On the evening of November 1st, the young editor was a prominent figure in a tremendous Democratic torchlight procession, serving as one of the “aids of the Grand Marshall.”(71) The l840's fell in an era of huge political spectacles, and English was an enthusiastic participant in them. Moreover, English was actively associated with a group of officers under Van Ness in the Custom House, the patronage of which was to [page 207:] be an important factor in the Democratic victory in New York. These varied activities brought English into contact with numerous personalities, some of whom he later wrote about entertainingly in recollections of those stirring times.

Among these interesting acquaintances of English were Mordecai M. Noah and Isaiah Rynders. Noah was then editor of the New York Sunday Times and Weekly Messenger, having earlier edited the Union in the interests of President Tyler's Administration prior to the merging of the latter paper with the Aurora on March 18, 1843.(72) Like English, Noah was a versatile man. In addition to his accomplishments as a journalist, he had attained considerable prominence as a playwright and had also served on the bench. English, who despite his absorption in politics and journalism had managed at the same time to write a few plays, naturally had a good deal in common with Noah and was his frequent companion. Captain Isaiah Rynders, a Tammany stalwart, was the founder of the renowned [page 208:] Empire Club, a much-feared political group which did not hesitate to use intimidation and even force in breaking up hostile political meetings. He and his club were especially active against the Whigs in the campaign of 1844. English has left the following lives of these two men and of his relations with them:

Another renowned personality who more than once crossed English's path during this period was the fiery anti-Tammany Democrat, Mike Walsh. It will be recalled that English and Walsh spoke from the same platform at the Tyler ratification meeting held in New York City on the evening of July 23, 1844, and that Walsh, although eulogizing Tyler at that meeting, had fallen out with those in control of the separate Tyler movement just as he had come to oppose the regular Democratic organization as represented by Tammany Hall. In the days when Tyler had first opposed the Bank policies of the Whigs, independents like Walsh and Bennett supported him enthusiastically. Early in Tyler's Administration English had gone to New York for the express purpose of aiding Mike Walsh, who was attempting to defeat the regular Tammany candidate in a contest for a seat in the State [page 210:] Assembly.(74) At that time Walsh was probably at the height of his influence. “He was the very model of a tribune of the people,” English recalled later. “Spare in form, lithe in motion, keen of eye, and with features that, in spite of some unpleasant lines about the mouth, betrayed a strong perceptive intellect; with great arrogance and determination — materials that fit one to gain power, though there was as it proved, a lack of ability to keep it. It needed only the daily attrition with men of mark and a sense of responsibility, to develope a prominent man.”(75)

It was a natural consequence of the political alignments of 1844, however, that friction should develop between English and Mike Walsh. Walsh detested Captain Rynders because of the latter's affiliation with Tammany, and when the withdrawal of Tyler in favor of Polk necessarily led to a close relationship between Tyler's supporters and the regular Democratic organization, it is understandable that Walsh did not relish the spectacle of English and Rynders working hand in glove with each other as respective leaders of the White Eagle and Empire clubs. It is probable, therefore, that the following incident related by English belongs to the latter part of 1844: [page 211:]

The very nature of English's political activities during the waning months of the Tyler Administration threw him into an especially close association with Cornelius P. Van Ness, the last of President Tyler's appointees to the Collectorship of the Port of New York. “He had a very troublesome time of it,” English observed later, “as all Collectors have, in the distribution of patronage, and I assisted him a little without being asked. He never refused me an appointment, and the result was that I was much pestered for an influence not so great as it was supposed to be. One day Henry C. Atwood, who was Surveyor at the time, asked me to get a certain party a place, and I did so. The week after he came to me with a similar request, stating that the applicant was a worthy man, with a large family, and so on. I thought this was rather crowding matters, but when I met the Collector I mentioned the man's name favorably. Van Ness looked at me fixedly, and said; ‘Didn’t Atwood ask you for this appointment?’ I laughed, and answered in the affirmative. ‘I thought so. He asked me a week since, and I evaded the matter. The man is really deserving, I believe; but don’t let the Surveyor use you.’ ‘He’ll scarcely ask me again,’ I said. ‘We’ll see,’ was the reply. A week had not passed before Atwood had another candidate; but this time I declined, telling Van Ness, however, who laughed.”(77) [page 213:]

On the basis of comments by the Whig press in New York during the campaign of 1844, there is every reason to conclude that the Whigs were greatly disturbed by the effective manner in which the Custom House officers under Van Ness were employed in the interests of Polk after Tyler had withdrawn from the race(78). Apparently these officers were expected to contribute, and did contribute, their time, their money, and their influence. Nonetheless, Van Ness was a man of Integrity, who had the confidence of the Administration, and he was determined that the affairs of his department should be conducted respectably. On October 1, 1844, he went so far as to issue an order announcing that although he did not object to his officers’ pursuing their political activities within the city, town, or county of their residence, he did object to their going abroad for such purposes, thereby most probably neglecting their official duties and consequently bringing the Customs department into disrepute.(79) [page 214:] At any rate, as can be seen from the following account by English, the Democrats were evidently much indebted to Van Ness for his judicious employment of the patronage of the New York Custom House in the autumn of 1844:

However narrowly it was accomplished, the election of Polk and Dallas was, in one important respect at [page 215:] least, a great victory for President Tyler. By becoming the champion of annexation and remaining in the field as a Presidential candidate until after the regular Democrats had made their choice, he forced the latter to nominate a pro-Texas man. He maneuvered both Clay and Van Buren into making public pronouncements upon the Texas question. Both declared against immediate annexation, and, as a result, Van Buren almost certainly lost his chance of being the nominee of the Democratic Party, and Clay, perhaps, lost the election.(81) So Polk's victory was in a very real sense Tyler's victory also. The annexation of Texas had been the chief issue in the campaign, and the people had declared themselves in favor of it. Tyler now had reason to expect less opposition to his efforts in behalf of annexation, and he accordingly devoted the rest of his term to a vigorous prosecution of the issue.

As for English, the Democratic triumph meant that the young editor's work in behalf of the Administration of John Tyler was almost over. He continued to edit the [page 216:] Aurora until its death two months later, but now that the battle has ended, its circulation, never large, began to dwindle. To the waning days of English's editorship belongs the only extant letter from English to President Tyler. It was written at the request of a Mr. Harrison, an engraver, and was addressed “To his Excellency John Tyler, President of the United States”:

Apparently, President Tyler continued to read the Aurora with interest up to the time that it died in English's hands, for as late as December 8, 1844, he mentioned to his brother-in-law how much he had enjoyed a certain article appearing in the paper. The article [page 217:] had evidently been written to condemn the recent machinations of office-holding politicians — perhaps those politicians who had secretly tried to bring about the election of Clay because they resented the rejection of Van Buren by the Democrats. At any rate, the motives of such men were thoroughly distasteful to Tyler, whose thoughts were now far away from the sordidness of practical politics. “I have read with infinite pleasure,” he wrote to Alexander Gardiner, “‘Rubicon’ in the Aurora — It is just and caustic — Was there ever a clique of such unprincipled men leagued together as that clique of ancient rulers — This love of office is their controulling passion — In despite of them however we shall leave the govt and country sound and prosperous, and if the annexation of Texas shall crown off my public life I shall neither retire ingloriously nor be soon forgotten — ”(83)

By January 4, 1845, the Aurora had ceased to be. Its death did not go unnoticed in the New York press, and the general tone of the notices, as might be expected, was far from complimentary. “The Aurora, the organ of Tylerism in this city,” said the editor of the New York Evening Mirror, “is no more. The ‘fair daughter of the dam [dawn] has sank [sic] into darkness — in plain English is dead.”(84) Two days later, James Gordon Bennett published [page 218:] a lengthy and scathing editorial in which he undertook to trace the brief history of the Aurora under its various editors, and to present this history derisively as a “lesson to all politicians who think to manufacture public sentiment by purchasing or setting up rickety newspapers which nobody reads.”(85) Of the final period of the Aurora's existence — the period of English's editorship — Bennett wrote with malicious relish. The paper, he commented, fell “into the hands of Col. Graham, Redwood Fisher, and a few others of that clan, who imported a man from Philadelphia — a Mr. Thomas Dunn English, ‘sole editor of the Aurora — to whose hands the poor thing was committed to die — which destiny it has at length accomplished, much to the relief, doubtless, of the nurses, both wet and dry, and the paying members of the contributing fund weekly raised for its support.”(86) But the press, generally, was biased, and despite all derogatory comments, English had doubtless accomplished with reasonable success the task required of him.

At any rate, in Washington, the long battle for annexation was rapidly approaching an end. On January 25, [page 219:] 1845, the House of Representatives passed a bill authorizing annexation by a joint resolution of the Senate and the House. Largely because of the recalcitrancy of Benton, the Senate failed to act until late in February. Benton held out for a bill of his own whereby Congress would be enabled to admit a new State through the medium of a “mission to negotiate terms of annexation, to be submitted to the Senate by the executive, and ratified as a treaty, or as articles to the two Houses of Congress, to be directly passed upon by them.”(87) Through the offices of Robert J. Walker, however, the Senate finally agreed to a proposal whereby the President was left free to adopt either the plan approved by the House or that advocated by Benton. The House quickly accepted the alterations made by the Senate, and on March 1st President Tyler approved the amended resolutions. After a brief delay arising from a deferential feeling toward Polk, Tyler decided that any action of his which might lead to even a brief postponement of annexation would have harmful results. Consequently, since he had a choice of alternatives, he elected to act upon the House resolution rather than upon the Benton plan. Accordingly, on March 3rd instructions, drawn by the Secretary of State, Calhoun, and approved by the President, were sent to Major Donelson, American charge [page 220:] d ‘affaires in Texas. This action brought to an end the long and successful struggle for annexation insofar as the United States was concerned.(88) President Tyler had indeed won a signal victory just as his term drew to a close.

While a messenger was speeding on his way to deliver the approved instructions to Major Donelson, throngs of people were converging on Washington to attend the Inauguration of the President elect. Among these were many of John Tyler's political admirers, who were determined also that the retiring President should not leave the city without a rousing farewell tribute. Thomas Dunn English arrived from New York, as did large delegations from the White Eagle and Empire clubs. Since English was apparently treasurer as well as president of the White Eagle Club, he probably had much to do with the arrangements whereby members of both clubs were to participate in the farewell tribute to John Tyler.

Upon his arrival in Washington, English, who had hitherto avoided an interview with the President, called [page 221:] on him at the White House. If English's recollection of this interview, written in 1869, can be relied upon, he evidently arrived at the White House on March 3rd, after the instructions in regard to Texas had been dispatched to Major Donelson but before any of President Tyler's personal friends had assembled to bid their leader farewell and to escort him to Fuller's Hotel. At any rate, English's interesting account of what must have been a rather inopportune visit is as follows:

Later in the afternoon of March 3rd many friends of President Tyler gathered in the Blue Room of the White House to say goodbye. General Peter Van Ness, a brother of Cornelius, delivered the farewell address. It was a sincere and appropriate speech, but one for which the speaker apologized as not being the polished gem that the occasion merited. The President's reply was a happy one. Turning to Van Ness, he remarked: “You say, sir, that the address you have made me is no gem. You do yourself injustice: it is a gem, polished by the hand of friendship, which will ever sparkle rare upon my heart.”(90) The retiring President then went on to deliver an extemporaneous address which was acclaimed by those who heard it as a noble example of genuine eloquence.(91) The speech, according [page 223:] to a contemporary account, “was delivered in a voice singularly melodious and varied, and with a manner combining great dignity and grace.”(92)

Whether English was actually at the White House when General Van Ness spoke and the President replied is not clear. At any rate, as leader of the White Eagle Club, he doubtless played a prominent part in the final celebrations honoring his chief. About five o’clock in the afternoon the President and his family were accompanied by their many friends to Fuller's Hotel, where they were loudly cheered by a large gathering including numerous representatives of the White Eagle and Empire clubs. “The scene was enlivened,” said a newspaper correspondent, “by the presence of the gunners, a kind of artillery company, with red uniforms and gay badges, &c. from New York, who arrived with their gun, today, about 12 o’clock, and who I at first thought had come from Baltimore. They are likely looking young men, who belong to the ‘White Eagle Club in New York.’ ”(93)

President Tyler's rooms at Fuller's were filled with visitors until it was time for the family to go to bed. Early the next morning, according to an account in the Madisonian, “the President was saluted by the White Eagle Artillery. The concussion of the cannon unfortunately [page 224:] shattered some of the windows of the house.”(94) Alexander Gardiner was awakened by the concussion, but in a letter to one of his sisters he did not allude to the resulting damage. “This morning,” he wrote, “I was aroused by a salute from cannon in front of the premises and renewed cheers for John Tyler. So he emerged from the storms of this wonderful administration in complete triumph and happy sunshine.”(95)

Needless to say, the common judgment prevailing at the time would hardly have supported Alexander Gardiner's enthusiastic comment that President Tyler had closed his term “in complete triumph.” The abuse which had been heaped upon the President had been too effectively employed to have permitted any such acknowledgment on the part of the great majority. It is most significant, however, that the judgment of history, to which President Tyler appealed, has come more and more to be a favorable judgment. Nowhere is this fact better illustrated than in Justin H. Smith's evaluation of John Tyler's rôle in the struggle for the annexation of Texas. Probably the most thorough investigator of the history of the movement, Smith has left behind the following verdict which cannot be discounted: “The opponents of annexation in the United States, with numerous exceptions, appear to [page 225:] have been actuated by no peculiarly elevated motives, and too commonly they showed less patriotism and sagacity than its advocates. Among the leaders Tyler, the unpopular, comes out rather distinctly best, as so often occurs when conduct and principles are closely examined.”(96)

Along with other ardent supporters of John Tyler and his Administration, Thomas Dunn English had to face derision of the same sort that was heaped upon the President. Often fighting side by side with the President's son, Robert, he was in an excellent position to observe how prejudice against a national leader can become so bitter as to be transferred without adequate cause to members of that leader's family. The press of the period was rabid in its denunciation of Robert Tyler. In view, therefore, of the reversal of judgment that history has begun to accord John Tyler, it is fitting to bring to a close the story of English's rôle in the Tyler Administration with the poet-politician's own recorded judgment of the President for whose principles he had fought and of that President's eldest son, by whose side he had fought and with whom he had endured no small measure of ridicule and abuse. This judgment, English recorded nearly a quarter of a century after the close of President Tyler's stormy term:

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